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Abstract 
 
Many safety and mission critical systems depend on 
the correct and secure operation of both supportive 
and core software systems. E.g., both the safety of 
personnel and the effective execution of core missions 
on an oil platform depend on the correct recording 
storing, transfer and interpretation of data, such as 
that for the Logging While Drilling (LWD) and 
Measurement While Drilling (MWD) subsystems. Here, 
data is recorded on site, packaged and then 
transferred to an on-shore operational centre. Today, 
the data is transferred on dedicated communication 
channels to ensure a secure and safe transfer, free 
from deliberately and accidental faults. 
However, as the cost control is ever more important 
some of the transfer will be over remotely accessible 
infrastructure in the future. Thus, communication will 
be prone to known security vulnerabilities exploitable 
by outsiders. This paper presents a model that 
estimates risk level of known vulnerabilities as a 
combination of frequency and impact estimates derived 
from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS). The model is implemented as a Bayesian 
Belief Network (BBN). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Safety and mission critical systems need to ensure 
both the safety of personnel and the profitable 
execution of their core missions. These systems are 
relying on software systems both in their core mission 
and in supportive tasks, such as Logging While Drilling 
(LWD) and Measurement While Drilling (MWD) 
support subsystems to offshore oil installations. Log 
files are large and complex and requires experts for a 
correct and safe assessment. However, increasing cost 
demands makes it non-profitable to have the necessary 
expertise on-site. Experts are therefore moved to on-
shore operational support centres. This means that log 
data are recorded and packaged offshore and 
transferred to other, sometimes multiple, locations on-
shore. For data to be correctly processed it is crucial 
that all steps involved are executed in a secure and safe 
manner free from deliberately and accidental fault 
introduction. Due to this, data is usually transferred on 
dedicated communication channels either owned by the 
oil or service company themselves or leased from 
trusted third parties. As dedicated communication links 
are expensive and as cost control is ever more 
important it is likely that some of the data transfer will 
be over infrastructure that is remotely accessible. This 
increases the risks of intentionally and accidentally 
fault introduction. 
Executing mission (including safety missions) and 
ensuring sustainable profit is both important, although 
maybe not always equally important. This involves 
trade-offs and the trade-offs relevant for LWD and 
MWD subsystems is whether it is reasonably safe to 
use less expensive communication infrastructure. In 
this paper, we assume the use of remotely accessibility 
communication infrastructure prone to inherent or 
accidental fault introduction of known vulnerabilities 
and show how to use existing experience data to 
estimate the frequency of potential fault introduction 
and the magnitude of impact that these may have. In 
particular, we use the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) and the paper describes a model 
developed to estimate risk level from frequency and 
impact estimates derived using CVSS data. The model 
is implemented as a BBN to allow for multiple 
frequency and impact estimation sources and to allow 
for combining CVSS [3,14] with expert opinions; that 
is, supporting disparate information sources. 
The paper is structured as following. Section 2 
points to related work on controlling security risks to 
place the paper into context. Section 3 introduces the 
risk level estimation model. Section 4 discusses CVSS 
and Section 5 discusses how to use CVSS as an 
information source for frequency and impact 
estimation. Section 5 also introduces the concept of 
BBN and discusses the risk level estimation model 
BBN. Section 6 gives an example, while Section 7 
summarises the main contributions of the paper and 
points to future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Our work is mainly related to controlling security 
risks and in particular quantifying security risks; that is, 
quantitative risk analysis. The current strategies for 
controlling security risks are: (i) penetration and patch, 
(ii) standards, (iii) risk management/assessment and 
(iv) “wait and see” approaches. The latter is similar to 
the first, only different in the fact that penetration and 
patch often includes authorised penetration and patch 
activities such as tiger-team activity. ``Wait and see'' is 
a passive security strategy where problems are fixed 
only after the fact and if budget allows. 
Standards provide tools for evaluating the security 
and safety controls of systems. Examples of such are 
ISO 15408:2007 Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation [8] within the security 
domain and IEC 61508:1998 Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/program-mable electronic safety-
related systems [7] within the safety domain. However, 
most evaluations, even though they follow a standard, 
are a qualitative and subjective activity biased by the 
evaluator. 
Risk assessment was initially developed within the 
safety domain, but has later been adapted to security 
critical systems as security risk assessment. The two 
most relevant approaches are CCTA Risk Analysis and 
Management Methodology (CRAMM) [2] and the 
CORAS framework [15]. CRAMM targets health care 
information systems and is asset-driven. The CORAS 
framework is inspired by CRAMM and has adapted the 
asset-driven strategy of CRAMM.  
The main deficiency of the above approaches is that 
the risk level is not under control, meaning that there 
has not been a prior activity on deciding which risk to 
accept and not to accept based on a cost-benefit 
strategy. These are the challenges of the research 
domain of quantifying security or operational security. 
An initial model towards quantitative estimation of 
security risk, also referred to as operational security, 
was discussed in Littlewood et al. (1993) [12]. The 
model derives quantitative operational measures such 
as mean time and effort to security breach. This idea 
was further explored in [4,5,13,16]. 
This paper extends the availability prediction model 
from [5] and uses CVSS to estimate frequency and 
impact of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. 
 
3. Risk level estimation model 
 
To estimate risk level we need to specify not only 
the expected behaviour and services that the safety and 
mission critical system offers, but also the ability of the 
system to resist external faults and in particular 
intentional faults [10]. The latter is usually referred to 
as the ability of the system to withstand security attacks 
or attack resistance capabilities. For these systems, 
security attacks might be the cause of reduction of 
either/or the system's safety level or its core mission 
execution abilities. This means that security 
interchange with safety and mission criticality in that 
preserving security becomes one of the core missions 
of the system. Figure 1 gives an overview of the 
potential fault introduction sources and how these may 
affect the risk level.  
The risk level estimation model is based on work by 
Laprie (1992/2004) [1,11] and Jonsson (1992) [10]. 
Definition A fault occurs when authorised user, 
unauthorised user (attacker) or system internal input 
causes an error in the system. 
Definition A failure is an undesirable system state. 
A failure may lead to degradation of safety and/or core 
mission level and thereby increase the risk level. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Fault introduction and risk level 
 
3.1. Computational procedure for deriving 
risk level 
 
The risk level model is supported by a three step 
computational procedure: (1) Identify vulnerabilities, 
(2) Estimate frequency and impact of vulnerabilities 
using CVSS and (3) Derive risk level from frequency 
and impact estimates. 
Step 1 is performed by examining the CVSS and/or 
by running a vulnerability scanner to derive a list of 
vulnerabilities in the system. However, the latter is not 
always possible in practise. The risk levels of a 
vulnerability defines its severity. This does not always 
mean that two vulnerabilities having the same risk level 
pose the same severity in terms of reducing the service 
level (safety and mission level) of a system. Also, risk 
is perceived differently by different stakeholders and 
has only meaning within a context.  
Step 2 estimates the frequency and impact of the 
vulnerabilities using the experience information in the 
CVSS. Details are given in the following. 
Step 3 takes the resulting frequency and impact 
estimations and combines them into a risk level. As the 
model is implemented as a BBN this is done using the 
computational means of BBN.  
 
4. Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) 
 
 The CVSS, launched in 2004, is an effort to 
provide a universal and vender-independent score of 
known vulnerabilities. CVSS has already been adopted 
by big hardware and software development companies, 
like IBM, HP and Cisco as a reporting metric in 
vulnerability bulletins, by scanning tools vendor like 
Nessus and Qualys and by the NIST (National Institute 
of Standards and Vulnerabilities), which maintains the 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD); the main 
repository of known vulnerabilities worldwide. 
The CVSS score, a decimal number on a scale 0.0-
10.0, is composed of three metrics groups: base, 
temporal and environmental [14]. The base metrics 
group quantifies the intrinsic characteristics of a 
vulnerability in terms of two sub-scores: (i) 
exploitability_subscore; composed of access required 
(B_AR), access complexity (B_AC) and authentication 
instances (B_AU), and (ii) impact_subscore to 
confidentiality (B_C), integrity (B_I) and availability 
(B_A) in terms of none, partial or complete. The 
temporal metrics group quantifies dynamic aspects of 
a vulnerability in terms of three attributes: (i) 
exploitability tools & techniques (T_E), (ii) 
remediation level (T_RL) and (iii) report confidence 
(T_RC). The exploitability attribute refers to the 
availability of code or technique for exploiting a 
vulnerability and is evaluated in terms of: unproved, 
proof-of-concept, functional or high. The remediation 
level attribute refers to the type of remediation 
available for the vulnerability in terms of official fix, 
temporary fix, workaround or unavailable. The report 
confidence attribute refers to the certainty of 
information about the existence of the vulnerability. It 
is evaluated as unconfirmed, uncorroborated 
(conflicting sources of information) or confirmed. For 
all three attributes the list of options reflects increasing 
levels of exploitability. The environmental metrics 
group quantifies two relevant aspects of a vulnerability 
that are dependent on the environment and on 
stakeholders’ values: (i) collateral damage potential 
(E_CDP) and (ii) security requirements. The collateral 
damage potential measures the potential damage to life 
loss, physical asset loss, loss of revenue and loss of 
productivity in terms of the qualitative scale none, low, 
low-medium, medium-high or high. The security 
requirements refer to the desired level of 
confidentiality (E_CR), integrity (E_IR) and 
availability (E_AR) of the system and are measured in 
terms of low, medium or high.  
More information on CVSS in general and the 
CVSS formulas in particular are in the CVSS guide 
[3,14]. 
 
5. Estimating frequency and impact 
using CVSS 
 
We use the CVSS to estimate the two variables 
frequency and impact. In fact, we rearrange the CVSS 
attributes to calculate frequency and impact instead of 
base, temporal and environmental scores. I.e., the more 
exploitable is a vulnerability, the more likely it will be 
exploitable by attackers, and the higher should be its 
frequency. By considering the exploitability factors 
intrinsic to the vulnerability itself (i.e. the base metrics 
related to exploitability) and the temporal factors we 
are able to calculate the frequency for all vulnerabilities 
present in the system. The same rationale applies to 
impact. The impact potential of a vulnerability (i.e. the 
base metrics related to impact) depends on the security 
requirements to the system and the collateral damage 
potential of the vulnerability (i.e. the environmental 
metrics related to impact).  
 
5.1. Obtaining temporal and environmental 
data 
 
Unlike the base metrics, which are available for all 
vulnerability in the CVSS, the temporal and 
environmental metrics are obtained elsewhere. 
The temporal metrics used for the calculation of 
frequency refer to the availability of fixes, the 
availability of exploitation tools & techniques and the 
availability of evidences that confirm the vulnerability. 
Although the CVSS does not provide the temporal and 
environmental metrics, because they are dynamic, it 
provides external links (http://www.securityfocus.com, 
http://xforce.iss.net, http://www.readhat.com) and 
references to vendors' sites that contain relevant 
information. Additional information can be collected 
from specialised forums (http://isc.sans.org/, 
http://www.modsecurity.org/blog) and media 
(http://www.darkreading.com/). Furthermore, the 
CVSS guide [14] supplies some guidelines for 
assigning qualitative values to the temporal metrics. 
Thus, temporal metrics are dependent on expert 
judgment of public information about a specific 
vulnerability. 
The environmental metrics used for the calculation 
of impact refer to the system security requirements (C I 
A) and collateral damage. Security requirements are 
given by stakeholders on a system basis (as they are 
system specific). Collateral damage is specific to an 
organisation and depend on a coherent and agreed upon 
definition of the inherent meaning of low, low-medium, 
medium-high and high loss. This means that the 
underlying CDP qualitative value scale must be defined 
per organisation. 
 
5.2. Estimating frequency from base and 
temporal data 
 
Frequency is a value in the range [0,1], where the 
value 0 means that the vulnerability will never be 
exploited and the value 1 means that the vulnerability 
will for certain be exploited. Values in the range 
<0,0.5> means low possibility for the vulnerability to 
be exploited and values in the range <0.5,1.0> means 
high possibility for the vulnerability to be exploited. 
The value 0.5 should be interpreted as that it is just as 
likely that the vulnerability will be exploited as that it 
will not. 
The risk level estimation model is implemented as a 
BBN. BBN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) together 
with an associated set of probability tables. A DAG 
consists of nodes representing the variables involved 
and arcs representing the dependencies between these 
variables. Nodes are defined as stochastic or decision 
variables and multiple variables may be used to 
determine the state of a node. Each state of a node is 
expressed using probability density functions. 
Probability density expresses the confidence in the 
various outcomes of the set of variables connected to a 
node and depends conditionally on the status of the 
parent nodes at the incoming edges. 
There are three types of nodes in a DAG: (1) target 
node(s), (2) intermediate nodes and (3) observable 
nodes. Target nodes are nodes about which the 
objective of the network is to make an assessment (the 
question that needs an answer). The directed arcs 
between the nodes denote the causal relationship 
between the underlying variables. Evidence or 
information is entered at the observable nodes and 
propagated through the network using the causal 
Figure 2. Risk level estimation model BBN 
relationships and a propagation algorithm based on the 
underlying computational model of BBN [9]. Our 
model is implemented using the BBN tool HUGIN [6] 
and this introduces the additional semantics of: 
stochastic variables are modelled as ovals, decision 
variables are modelled as rectangles and the associated 
utility functions supporting the decision variables are 
modelled as diamonds. 
Figure 2 shows the risk level estimation model 
BBN. The frequency part is on the left side of the 
figure. 
The frequency estimate is derived by inserting the 
values for the base metrics sub variables first and from 
those derive the initial frequency. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, there is a dependency between the sub 
variables B_AC and B_AR. That is, the attack 
complexity is dependent on the access required. This 
points to that it is easier to exploit a vulnerability in 
cases where only network access is required. If local 
access is required it becomes substantially more 
difficult both to launch and to carry out an attack 
without being discovered. Furthermore, authentication 
instances is both dependent on the attack complexity 
and the access required (B_AU|(B_AR,B_AC)), as it is 
likely that one need several authentication instances if 
the exploit is complex and if it requires local access. 
There might also be dependency in the other direction 
(that is attack complexity dependent on authentication 
instances), but this is not specified in the CVSS. 
The temporal metrics sub variables is used to derive 
the update factor and covers the indirect circumstances 
of an attack. Exploitability tools & techniques points to 
the availability of automated tools to exploit the 
vulnerability. Remediation level refers to the 
effectiveness of the existing security measures and 
report confidence describes the trust level one should 
have towards the values provided for the base metric 
sub variables. 
 
5.3. Estimating impact from base and 
environmental data 
 
As for frequency, the base metrics are used to 
establish the initial impact value. However, for impact 
it is the environmental metrics that are used to update 
the initial value. The environmental metrics are context 
specific; that is, they put the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability impacts into perspective of the 
associated requirements and the collateral damage 
potential relevant for a particular system. Hence, the 
base metrics describe the magnitude of the effect on 
each security property, which is later made system 
specific by applying the environmental metrics to the 
base metrics. The impact part of the risk level 
estimation model BBN is shown on the right side of 
Figure 2. 
 
6. Example 
 
In the modern offshore drilling environment the 
Logging and Measurement While Drilling (LWD and 
MWD) subsystems are integral parts of maintaining 
business continuity and safety. LWD data is formation 
evaluation (FE) data used by geologists to optimise the 
placement of the well in real-time. MWD data includes 
the direction and inclination of the well, drilling and 
tool mechanical information and pressure indicators. 
For the drilling operation, the FE data together with 
tool and drilling mechanical data are mission critical. 
The safety critical data are the pressure readings from 
surface and down hole, which are used for 
identification of kicks, blow-outs and stuck-pipe 
situations, and directional data relevant for collision 
prevention.  
Over the last half-decade several on-shore drilling 
operational support centres have been established. 
These centres simultaneously support multiple offshore 
installations with field, directional drilling, safety, etc. 
experts that monitors the drilling operations in real-
time. By doing so, the experts are physically co-located 
and can assist each other in real-time. This is 
particularly important during failure situations. 
The use of these on-shore operational centres adds 
demands on the reliability, availability, confidentiality 
and integrity of the communication link and 
communicated data between the offshore and on-shore 
sites. Earlier all communication was over shield, 
company owned or trusted third party leased 
communication links. Due to cost constraints the 
situation is changing and remotely accessible 
communication means have been introduced. This 
exposes data to remotely accessible vulnerabilities in 
the communication mean or the communication end-
points. In the following we discuss how to use the 
CVSS to estimate the risk level of safety and mission 
critical data in the context of drilling support 
operational centres.  
Lets say that we identify a vulnerability with the 
following base attributes: B_AR=network, B_AC=low 
and B_AU=none. These are the base metric sub 
variables used to derive the initial frequency (see 
Figure 2). Expert evaluation of the vulnerability reveal 
the following associated temporal metric sub variable 
values: T_E=functional, T_RL=workaround and 
T_RC=con-firmed. Combining these two sets of 
information gives the frequency estimate: low=0.0, 
medium=0.25 and high=0.75, which means that there 
is three times more likely that the frequency is high 
than medium (it is never low). Note that the prior 
probability distributions for the sub variables are 
provided by the CVSS. 
The impact information available (in the CVSS) for 
the vulnerability is the following: B_CI=complete, 
B_I=none and B_A=none. The relevant security 
requirements are: E_CR=high, E_IR=medium, 
E_AR=medium and the collateral damage potential is: 
E_CDP=low. Deriving the impact distribution 
according to the impact part of Figure 2 results in: 
low=0.4, medium=0.3 and high=0.3. 
The frequency and impact distributions are then 
used to derive the risk level estimation distribution (see 
Figure 2). The resulting risk level estimate distribution 
is: low=0.05, medium=0.57 and high=0.38, which 
means that the risk level most likely is medium (57% 
chance). It is also relatively likely that the risk level is 
high (38% chance). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown how to use the CVSS to 
estimate frequency and impact of remotely reachable 
vulnerabilities for safety and mission critical systems. 
The CVSS consists of the three metrics groups: base, 
temporal and environmental. We use the base and 
temporal metrics to estimate frequency and the base 
and environmental to estimate impact. Frequency and 
impact estimates are then combined to a risk level 
estimate using a risk level estimation model BBN. 
Future work involves extending the estimation 
model BBN to support alternative frequency and 
impact estimation information sources, such as vendor 
specific vulnerability bulletin lists, attack reports 
(NIST, security bulletin lists, news groups, etc.) and 
subjective expert judgments. We have developed a 
trust-based information aggregation schema that will be 
used to aggregate these disparate sources of 
information. 
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